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In this paper, we consider a two-country model based on Svensson
(1989) in order to analyze how …scal harmonization impacts on economic
growth and welfare through its e¤ects on agents portfolio decisions in an
uncertain world. We derive the conditions under which …scal harmoniza-
tion proves to be welfare enhancing and analyse how the set of initial tax
rates leading to a welfare improving harmonization is a¤ected by uncer-
tainty and assets returns correlation. In particular, the results obtained
suggest that the probability for tax harmonization to be welfare improving
is …rst increasing and then decreasing with uncertainty while it monoton-
ically decreases with the correlation between the assets returns shocks.
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11 Introduction
The issue of …scal harmonization is a classic in the economic literature and is
frequently inscribed both on research and economic policy agendas. This is par-
ticularly true for Europe where the integration process taking place under the
auspice of the European Union explicitly contains objectives of reducingnational
discrepancies in …scal domains. The debate seems particularly controversial as
far as …nancial assets are concerned. While …scal harmonization was the option
favored during the 70’s-80’s, today’s approach is more oriented towards coun-
tries keeping some sovereignty and developing di¤erent forms of cooperation. To
a large extent, the cooperation/harmonization issue has mostly been analyzed
by focusing on …scal competition aspects. Cooperation indeed allows to solve
a coordination failure between the authorities collecting taxes and is therefore
shown to generate gains in e¢ciency and welfare. Nevertheless, it may con‡ict
with the principle of subsidiarity which pushes public decisions to be taken at
the most local level. This generates an interesting trade-o¤ concerning the ap-
propriate organization of …scal matters1.
However, the piece of literature ignores the stochastic nature of the environ-
ment surrounding economic decisions. In fact, taxing uncertain ‡ows may not
be similar to taxing ‡ows that are known for sure. Indeed, considering taxes
collected on …nancial assets, Smith (1991) shows how uncertainty a¤ects the
relationship between taxes and economic decisions in a non trivial way. The
idea is that when taxing the stochastic return of an asset, both the average
return and its associated variance are reduced. Thus, in the presence of risk
averse agents, taxes may have an a priori ambiguous e¤ect on welfare even if
they are not used to …nance something like a public good. Since such e¤ects of
taxes are related to the stochastic nature of the environment, it seems interest-
ing to reconsider the problem of the relevance of a …scal harmonization under
uncertainty. Abstracting from any …scal competition consideration, we empha-
size the conditions under which …scal harmonization is desirable and show how
its relevance crucially depends on uncertainty. This implies that taking deci-
sions about tax harmonization without considering the stochastic nature of the
economy may clearly be misleading.
In this paper, we therefore propose a two-country model based on Svensson
(1989) or Obstfeld (1994) in a multi-country setting, in order to analyze how
…scal harmonization impacts on welfare through its e¤ects on agents portfolio
decisions2. Note that these assets may be viewed as being the production of
the country. We then derive the conditions under which …scal harmonization
proves to be welfare enhancing by considering the way taxes a¤ect the assets
characteristics and hence portfolio choices. The results obtained suggest that
1See the literature on tax competition and …scal harmonization, for instance, Keen (1989),
Sinn (1990 and 1994), Kanbur and Keen (1993), Cremer and Gahvari (2000).
2Therefore, our setting may be viewed as a particular case of a more general problem :
taxation choice of di¤erent competing assets without paying attention to the number and
identity of …scal authorities.
2the probability for tax harmonization to be welfare improving is dependent on
the size of uncertainty as well as on the correlation between the assets returns
shocks. Finally, the paper provides one simple example based on calibrations
using German and French data.
Section 2 presents the model and the relevant resolution method. The way
taxes a¤ect portfolio decisions is analyzed in section 3. Section 4 describes the
characteristics of an optimal taxation scheme. Section 5 then examines the issue
of …scal harmonization and section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a two-country continuous-time model allowing for an analytical
resolution. In this section, we …rst recall the methodological interest of the
recursive utility function; we then specify the assets portfolio characteristics.
Finally we introduce taxes.
2.1 The recursive utility function
Following Kreps and Porteus (1978), Epstein and Zin (1991) and Weil (1990),
the representative agent in each country maximizes the same recursive utility
function which disentangles between risk aversion and intertemporal elasticity
of substitution. Indeed, there is no reason for tastes so di¤erent in nature as
the one for intertemporal substitution and the one for risk to be captured by
the same parameter. In this utility function, the intertemporal utility at time t
depends on consumption at this date and on the certainty equivalent of future
utility at time t + dt which is written ^ U(t+ dt); the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution between current consumption and the certainty equivalent of future













where " is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and ± the time preference
rate. Note that 1=" may also be understood as the aversion to ‡uctuations.
The certainty equivalent at time t of the intertemporal utility at time t + dt
depends on the agent’s attitude with respect to risk which is taken into account
through the usual Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) functional form:
F(U(t + dt)) = [U(t+ dt)]









with U(t + dt) being the future intertemporal stochastic utility. One …nally




















Note that in the special case in which the risk aversion is the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (° = 1="), this utility function adopts







2.2 Portfolio assets characteristics and wealth
There exists one risky asset in each country. Both asset returns (qi, i = 1;2)
are assumed to follow geometric Brownian motions4:
dqi(t)
qi(t)
= ®dt+ ¾dzi(t); i = 1;2
where zi is the vector of the increment of a Wiener process i.e. dzi(t) =
²i(t)
p
dt ; ²i(t) s iid N(0;1). The returns consist of two components: ®
is the deterministic component and ¾dzi(t) is the stochastic one where ¾ is
the standard error. Finally, the Wiener process increments are correlated:
dz1(t)dz2(t) = ½1;2dt: Note that such a speci…cation implies the determinis-
tic part of the assets returns as well as the size of the risk on each return to be
identical across countries. Nevertheless, returns are subject to di¤erent shocks
that may be imperfectly correlated.
In each country, the representative agent’s wealth only comes from the return
on her portfolio. This portfolio consists of shares of the two countries assets.
Since agents have the same utility function and the same access to both assets
irrespective of the country where they live, they choose the same assets shares
and we therefore may consider only one representative agent for both countries.
Her wealth is written:
dW(t)
W (t)
= ®dt + !¾dz1(t) + (1¡ !)¾dz2(t) ¡
C(t)
W (t)
where ! is the share of country 1 asset in the representative agent portfolio.
2.3 Taxes
Each country’s government levies a tax which is proportional to the asset return,
¿ i 2 (0;1) denoting the tax rate on asset i return. This tax a¤ects the deter-
ministic part of the return as well as its stochastic component. The after-tax
3Using a transformation of the type (U(t)=a)a as proposed by Du¢e and Epstein (1992),
with a = "=(" ¡1) :
4Such a modelling allows to take into account that the smaller the forecast interval, the
sharper the evaluation of an asset value.
4return of each asset may thus be expressed as follows:
dqi(t)
qi(t)
= (1 ¡ ¿ i)®dt+ (1¡ ¿i)¾dzi(t); i = 1;2
We assume that the government uses this tax to …nance the provision of a
public good which enters neither the utility function nor wealth5. Importantly, it
is this assumption that to eliminate …scal competition aspects from the analysis.
The evolution of the representative agent’s wealth is then:
dW(t)
W(t)




3 Exogenous tax and diversi…cation





























This is a standard consumption/saving arbitrage and portfolio choice prob-
lem under uncertainty similar to the one which has initially been considered by
Merton (1969, 1971). It has already been solved by Svensson (1989) and leads
to the following …rst order conditions (see appendix 1):
C
¤(t) = ["± ¡ (" ¡ 1)Â
¤(t)]W(t) (6)
!(t)¤ =
®(¿2 ¡ ¿1) ¡ °¾2(1¡ ¿ 2)
£
½1;2(1 ¡ ¿1) ¡ (1¡ ¿2)
¤
°¾2 £
(1¡ ¿1)2 ¡ 2½1;2(1 ¡ ¿ 1)(1¡ ¿2) + (1¡ ¿ 2)2¤ (7)
where Â¤(t) is the certainty equivalent of the portfolio rate of return when
the asset shares are optimally chosen:
Â
¤(t) = ®(1¡ ¿1)!(t)









+2½1;2(1 ¡ ¿1)(1¡ ¿ 2)!(t)
¤(1 ¡ !(t)





One may note (see appendix 1) that maximizing the expected value of the
intertemporal utility with respect to the assets shares reduces to the maximiza-
tion of the certainty equivalent of the portfolio rate of return Â(t) with respect
5Note that the government revenue is : dT(t) = !¿1 (adt +¾dz1(t)) + (1 ¡
!)¿2 (adt +¾dz2(t)). So, it may be the case for negative shocks, that this revenue becomes
negative, that is, the government has to provide subsidies. The model of Smith (1996) ex-
hibits the same feature. This introduces a partial equilibrium ‡avour in this type of models
since the intertemporal budget constraint of the government is not explicitely modelled. The
government may …nance its subsidies by creating an external debt or by levying taxes on other
sources of revenues.
5to these same shares. Portfolio allocation and consumption/saving trade-o¤
decisions are indeed separable: …rst, the representative agent determines her
portfolio structure, whose certainty equivalent rate of return depends on the
risk aversion and second, she decides the amount to consume depending on her
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. This is rather intuitive: in the absence
of reallocation cost inside the portfolio, there is no reason for the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution to a¤ect its composition. Moreover, once the certainty
equivalent of the portfolio rate of return has been determined, it seems obvious
that the risk aversion no longer a¤ects the consumption decision.
Note also that it is the use of a recursive utility function which allows to
show that the optimal portfolio composition is independent from the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution while this parameter enters the expression of the
optimal consumption.
With regard to the e¤ect of uncertainty, we have that, for given assets shares,
the volatility negatively a¤ects the certainty equivalent of the optimal portfolio
rate of return. Of course, the higher the risk aversion i.e. the higher the agent’s
sensitivity to uncertainty, the larger the e¤ect of uncertainty on Â¤(t). The






¤2 + 2½1;2(1¡ ¿1)(1 ¡ ¿2)!(t)
¤(1¡ !(t)













@¾2 = (1 ¡ ")W (t)
@Â¤(t)
@¾2 , > 0 if " > 1 and < 0 if " < 1
For a given current wealth, the optimal consumption depends on the cer-
tainty equivalent of the portfolio rate of return and on the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution. Moreover, the direction of the e¤ect of uncertainty on the
optimal consumption level is determined by the degree of intertemporal sub-
stitution: if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is greater than unity7,
an increase in uncertainty, which induces a smaller certainty equivalent for the
portfolio rate of return, eventually leads to a higher consumption today. The
intuition runs as follows: in a standard way, a decrease of the certainty equiv-
alent of the portfolio rate of return generates a substitution e¤ect, which urges
the representative agent to consume more today, together with an income e¤ect
which has the opposite e¤ect. As soon as the intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution is su¢ciently high (greater than unity) the substitution e¤ect prevails.
6Note that we only consider the e¤ect of uncertainty on the certainty equivalent of the
portfolio rate of return for given assets shares. The e¤ect via !(t)¤ indeed needs not to be
taken into account : since we only consider marginal variations of uncertainty, such an e¤ect
is only of second order magnitude by the envelope theorem.
7Note that an intertemporal elasticity of substitution greater than unity is implausible in
a CRRA utility function since it is largely admitted that the relative risk aversion coe¢cient
is greater than unity.
6The value function, that is the indirect utility function which gives the wel-















" > 0 (9)
Whatever the value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, a larger
uncertainty reduces the certainty equivalent of the portfolio rate of return which
unambiguously reduces welfare at each date.
3.1 Portfolio choice and taxes
Intuition suggests that the optimal share of a particular asset should be a de-
creasing function of the tax on its return. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Smith
(1996), the tax a¤ects both the deterministic part of the return and its stochas-
tic component. As we show below, this generates opposite e¤ects leading to a
more complex relationship between the optimal share and the tax.
For given values of the parameters characterizing the after tax assets return
(®, ¾ ¿1; ¿ 2 and ½12), we have two conditions ensuring that the optimal share
! of asset 1 (and thus of asset 2 as well) is between zero and unity. Imposing
that !¤ 2 [0;1] rules out degenerate solutions for which the representative agent
optimally chooses to sell short one of the asset to acquire a value of the other
asset which is larger than her wealth. These conditions are:
®0 < ® < ®1 i¤ ¿1 < ¿2





(1 ¡ ¿2) ¡ ½1;2(1 ¡ ¿1)
¤




½1;2(1¡ ¿ 2) ¡ (1 ¡ ¿1)
¤
¿1 ¡ ¿ 2
Moreover, it can be shown that the optimal share !¤ of asset 1 is such that:
² !¤(¿1) = 0 has one root
²
@!¤(¿1)
@¿1 = 0 has to two roots








Figure 2: !¤(¿ 1)
which implies (see …gures 1 and 2) that, when only considering the range of
¿ 1 for which asset shares are between 0 and unity, we have:
@!¤(¿1)
@¿1
> 0 for ¿1 < b ¿1 and
@!¤(¿1)
@¿1
< 0 for ¿1 > b ¿1
That is, this optimal share !¤ is …rst an increasing function and then a de-
creasing function of ¿ 1. Of course, nothing guarantees that b ¿1 is in the range
of ¿ 1 that we consider (i.e. the range of ¿1 between zero and unity and leading
to asset shares between zero and unity): if b ¿ 1 is on the left (resp. right) side
of the lower (resp. higher) bound of the range, only the decreasing (resp. the
increasing) part appears for the values of ¿ 1 we consider, while for b ¿1 belonging
to the range, !¤ is maximum for ¿ 1 = b ¿ 1.
The expression of
@!¤
@ ¿1 is tedious and di¢cult to interpret. In order to give
the intuition concerning the shape of the relationship between !¤ and ¿1, we
8can nevertheless use the properties of Â¤(t). Appendix 2 shows that the sign of
@!¤


















The e¤ect of ¿1 on !¤, can then be decomposed as follows:
² First, the deterministic e¤ect of the tax (-®) is negative. The increase in
the tax rate a¤ecting asset 1 indeed lowers the after tax deterministic part
of the asset return which reduces the incentive to hold this asset.
² Second, the stochastic e¤ect of the tax encompasses
- the volatility component (2°¾ 2(1¡ ¿1)!¤) which is positive and whose
magnitude depends on !¤ and ¿1. An increase in ¿1 reduces the
after tax volatility of asset 1 which in turns increases the certainty
equivalent of this asset rate of return, urging for a larger !¤:
- the correlation component (¡°½1;2¾2(1¡¿2)[!¤ ¡(1¡!¤)]) whose sign
depends on ½1;2 and !¤. For instance, for ½1;2 > 0 an increase in
¿1 reduces the negative e¤ect due to the correlation on the certainty
equivalent of the portfolio rate of return. Note that this e¤ect is max-
imum for asset shares equal to 1/2 (see equation(8)). Thus a lower
after tax correlation generates an incentive to hold shares that are
closer to the (1/2,1/2) combination. Finally, !¤ should increase i¤
its initial value is less than 1/2.
One now clearly checks that the impact of the tax on the assets shares results
from a complex mix of positive and negative e¤ects. The global e¤ect is such
that for small values of the tax rate, the optimal asset share is an increasing
function of the tax while it is decreasing with the tax for larger values. Of course,
according to parameters values, only the increasing (resp. decreasing) part of
the relationship may appear in the relevant range for the tax. We therefore
derive the following general result :
Proposition 1 The optimal share of one particular asset is not monotonically
decreasing with the tax on its return.
This result is due to a complex combination of three di¤erent e¤ects of the
tax on the corresponding optimal asset share:
(i) the …rst e¤ect reduces the deterministic part of its return
(ii) the second e¤ect reduces the stochastic part of its return
(iii) the third e¤ect reduces the absolute value of the correlation between its
return and that of the other asset
9The same reasoning applies for the optimal share of asset 2 when considering
variations in the tax rate of the second country. Since the two shares must add
up to one, we can also deduce that there may exist a negative relationship
between the tax rate of country 2 and the optimal share of asset 1.
3.2 Optimal consumption, welfare and taxes
As for the optimal share of one particular asset, the tax a¤ects the certainty
equivalent of the optimal portfolio as well as welfare and consumption in a
rather complex way through its deterministic and stochastic e¤ects. In particu-
lar, these variables are shown not to be always decreasing functions of the tax.
Let us …rst consider the e¤ect of taxes on the certainty equivalent of the





























Thus, the tax generates e¤ects of the same nature as those stressed in the
previous section (i.e. one through the deterministic part of the return, one
through its volatility and one through the correlation with the other asset re-
turn) and …nally, an increase in one of an increase in the tax rate may increase
or reduce the certainty equivalent of the optimal portfolio depending on the
relative magnitude of the three e¤ects. We then have the following proposition
:
Proposition 2 On the relevant range for the tax levied on one of the assets,
the certainty equivalent of the optimal portfolio is not necessarily monotonically
decreasing with the tax.
More precisely, it is shown in appendix 3 that it is …rst increasing and then
decreasing, or possibly only increasing or decreasing depending on the relevant
tax range, with the tax.
The e¤ect of the tax on the optimal consumption applies through the cer-
tainty equivalent of the optimal portfolio rate of return (see equation (6)).
Corollary 3 The direction of the e¤ect of taxes on welfare is the same as the
one of their e¤ect on Â¤(t) (see equation (9)).
Note that, as for uncertainty, the direction of the e¤ect of the tax on asset
1 rate of return on the optimal consumption depends …rst on the e¤ect of this
10tax on the certainty equivalent of the portfolio rate of return and second on the
value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution:
@C¤(t)
@¿1
= (1 ¡ ")W (t)
@Â¤(t)
@¿ 1
If an increase in the tax reduces the certainty equivalent of the portfolio rate
of return, this in turn reduces (resp. increases) the optimal current consumption
if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is less (resp. greater) than one (the
argument is exactly the same as the one developed when studying the e¤ect of
uncertainty on the optimal consumption).
Corollary 4 If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is less (resp. greater)
than unity, the optimal consumption is …rst increasing (resp. decreasing) and
then decreasing (resp. increasing) with the tax rates.
Again, depending on the relevant range for the tax, the consumption may
be only increasing or only decreasing with the tax rate.
4 Endogenous tax
In this section, we derive an optimal taxation scheme for the two risky assets.
This might seem at …rst glance irrelevant because taxes are usually seen as
distortionnary and are moreover not used here to increase welfare through the
provision of public goods. Nevertheless, due to the various e¤ects of the tax
described in the preceding section, an optimal taxation scheme may exist.
4.1 The central planner program
Considering an endogenous taxation problem, the representative agent program
remains the same. The central planner (who may be any of the two countries
governments since nothing allows to distinguish between agents of each country)
maximizes the value function of the representative agent with respect to the
taxes on each asset.
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
max¿1;¿2 V (t) = "












Â¤(t) = ®(1¡ ¿1)!(t)¤ ¡ ®(1 ¡ ¿2)(1¡ !(t)¤) ¡ 1
2°¾2 £
(1¡ ¿1)2!(t)¤2




The use of a recursive utility function highlights that this program only in-
volves the portfolio optimally chosen by the agents which is not a¤ected by the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution; thus, the optimal tax rates on the risky
assets returns are independent from the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.










® ¡ °¾2(1 + ½1;2)(1 ¡ ¿ 1)
+ 1 (10)
In fact two solutions for each tax rate are obtained. Since there are no as-
ymptotes in the functions Â(¿ 1) and Â(¿2), one of the solutions corresponds to
a minimum and can therefore be eliminated8. If ¿ ¤
1 2 [0;1], it is a global maxi-
mum on this range since it can be shown that Â(¿ ¤
1) > Â(1) and Â(¿¤
1) > Â(0).
The optimal tax structure (¿ ¤
1;¿¤
2) is given by the system (10). In fact, the
two relationships are identical so that the solution is obtained through only one
equation. Therefore, there is no unique optimal tax structure but instead a
in…nite-sized set of optimal couples (¿¤
1;¿ ¤
2) given by one of the equations of
(10). Importantly, even though assets share the same characteristics and only
di¤er according to shocks on their return, the optimal taxation scheme is not
necessarily one equalizing tax rates.
If taxes are optimal, we then obtain:
!(t)
¤ = 1 ¡
®
°¾2(1 + ½1;2)(1¡ ¿2)
Assets optimal shares are then between 0 and 1 as soon as
0 < ® < °¾2(1 + ½1;2)(1¡ ¿2)
Moreover, the condition ensuring that ¿¤
1 is between 0 and 1 is simply9:
0 < ® <
°¾2(1 + ½1;2)(1¡ ¿2)
2¡ ¿2
Note that considering public expenditures in the representative agent wealth
would generate a wedge between the ways the two countries are a¤ected by a
particular tax, which would lead to a unique tax structure but would also in-
troduce …scal competition.
8This minimum corresponds to the case for which the representative agent does not want
to hold both assets i.e. one of the share is zero (see appendix 2).
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® + °¾2(1+ ½1;2)(1 ¡ ¿ 2)
¤2 > 0
The larger the uncertainty (or the risk aversion which enhances the e¤ect of
uncertainty), the larger the optimal tax in one country given that of the other
country. This is explained by the fact that a larger uncertainty generates a
stronger need for the insurance role of the tax. On the contrary, an increase
in the deterministic part of the return makes this insurance less necessary and
therefore implies a lower level of the optimal tax rate.
Finally, it may be shown that there exists a negative relationship between
¿ ¤








® + °¾2(1 + ½1;2)(1¡ ¿ 2)
¤2 < 0
5 Fiscal harmonization
Using the framework developed above, we now address the issue of …scal harmo-
nization. As an example, we proceed by considering that the agreement between
the two countries implies that a common a symmetric tax structure is chosen
as the average of the pre-harmonization one10. Formally, denoting ¿a the har-
monized tax rate, we have ¿a
1 = ¿a
2 = ¿ a with ¿a = ¿1+¿2
2 and ¿ i corresponding
to the pre-harmonization tax rate of country i.
5.1 Analytical results
Of course, starting from an optimal taxation scheme, …scal harmonization can
never be welfare enhancing. This is trivial since, in this case, harmonization
implies to depart from a tax structure which has precisely been chosen to maxi-
mize welfare. This leads to the result that …scal harmonization may not always
be welfare enhancing even if assets exhibit the same characteristics (only shocks
di¤er). Therefore in some cases a less constraining cooperation scheme such as
10Of course, many other forms of harmonization could be considered without altering the
qualitative results.
13the one currently favored by the EU is a choice with a clear economic justi…ca-
tion. Nevertheless, there may be cases for which a …scal harmonization allows
to get closer to the tax structure that maximises welfare ; in such cases, a …scal
harmonization is welfare improving.
Starting from any pre-harmonization exogenous tax structure, we can de…ne
a set S(¿1;¿2) such that harmonization increases welfare. Fiscal harmonization
can therefore be considered as welfare improving for any initial tax structure
belonging to this set.
Let us …rst derive the set of taxes starting from which a …scal harmonization
leaves welfare unchanged. Solving this problem yields two relationships linking




and ¿ 2u(¿1) =
¡ (A ¡ B)
°¾ 2(1+ ½1;2)
with A = 4® ¡ °¾2(1 + ½1;2)
£






2® ¡ °¾2(1 + ½1;2)(1 ¡ ¿1)
¢2
+ °2¾4(1 + ½1;2)2(1¡ ¿1)2(1 ¡ ½1;2)=2
i
One may show that, in the space (¿ 1;¿ 2), these frontiers are both decreas-
ing with respect to ¿ 1, and that ¿2l(¿1) is concave while ¿ 2u(¿ 1) is convex.
Moreover, at their intersection with the 45± line, both curves feature a slope of
(-1).
Second, we show in appendix 4 that for any ¿1, the two frontiers de…ne an
interval [¿2l;¿2u] of ¿2 inside which …scal harmonization proves to be welfare
improving. Consequently, S(¿1;¿ 2) corresponds to the area de…ned by couples
(¿1;¿2) simultaneously between 0 and 1 and the two frontiers.
In order to appraise how uncertainty, the correlation between the shocks on
the assets returns and other parameters of the model (the assets rate of return,
the risk aversion) a¤ect the set S(¿ 1;¿2), we approximate the curve ¿2l(¿1) and
¿ 2u(¿1) using a …rst order Taylor expansion around their intersection with the
45± line. Let us denote these approximations by e ¿2l(¿1) and e ¿ 2u(¿1). We have:
e ¿ 2l(¿1) = (2¡ ¿1) ¡
4®
(1 + ½1;2)°¾2 (11)
e ¿ 2u(¿1) = (2¡ ¿1) ¡
4®
(3 ¡ ½1;2)°¾2 (12)
The horizontal distance between the two approximations is given by:
D = e ¿ 2u(¿1) ¡ e ¿2l(¿1) =
8®(1 ¡ ½1;2)
(3¡ ½1;2)(1 + ½1;2)°¾2
14Moreover we use e ¿2u(¿ 1) and e ¿2l(¿1) to approximate S(¿1;¿2) by e S(¿1;¿ 2)11.
Remember that S(¿1;¿2) corresponds to the area between the two frontiers for
tax rates between 0 and 1. It is then not true that when curves are getting
closer, S(¿1;¿ 2) decreases. This implies that in order to analyze the sensitivity
of e S(¿1;¿2) with respect to ®;¾;½1;2 and °, we must distinguish the following
cases (expressions for these areas as well as illustrative …gures are given in
appendix 5):
² e S(¿1;¿2) = e S1(¿1;¿2) when only e ¿2u(¿1) contains couples of taxes with
both elements between 0 and 1
² e S(¿1;¿2) = e S2(¿ 1;¿2) when both e ¿2l(¿1) and e ¿ 2u(¿ 1) contains couples of
taxes with both elements between 0 and 1/2
² e S(¿1;¿2) = e S3(¿1;¿ 2) when e ¿ 2l(¿ 1) contains couples of taxes with both
elements between 0 and 1/2 and e ¿2u(¿1) contains couples of taxes with
both elements between 1/2 and 1.
² e S(¿1;¿2) = e S4(¿ 1;¿2) when both e ¿2l(¿1) and e ¿ 2u(¿ 1) contains couples of
taxes with both elements between 1/2 and 1
² e S(¿1;¿2) = e S5(¿1;¿2) when only e ¿2l(¿1) contains couples of taxes with
both elements between 0 and 1.
The following …gure illustrate one of these cases (namely the one for which

























Figure 3: S(¿1;¿2) and ~ S(¿1;¿2)
The …rst derivative of these areas (e S1:::e S5) with respect to the model para-
meters are given in table 1.
11Appendix 6 contains numerical simulations suggesting that both S(¿1;¿2) and e S(¿1;¿ 2)
behave exactly in the same way with the model’s parameters.
15Table 1: Sensitivity of the welfare improving area with respect to
the parameters
Sign of the
…rst derivative of ! e ¿2l(¿1) e ¿ 2u(¿1) D e S1 e S2 e S3 e S4 e S5
with respect to #
¾ + + - + + + for ¾2 < ¾2
S - -
- for ¾2 > ¾2
S
° + + - + + + for ° < °S - -
- for ° > °S
® - - + - - + for ® < ®S + +
- for ® > ®S













Considering the e¤ect of an increase in uncertainty, we …rst note that the dis-
tance between the approximated frontiers becomes smaller while both frontiers
move upwards. Moreover, an increase in the deterministic part of the return
has exactly the opposite e¤ect.
Proposition 5 An increase in uncertainty or in risk aversion leads the set of
welfare improving pre-harmonization taxes to contain higher tax rates.
An increase in the deterministic rate of return leads the set of welfare im-
proving pre-harmonization taxes to contain lower tax rates.
In other words, if uncertainty is strong, harmonization is likely to be worth
on condition that intial tax rates are relatively high. This is quite intuitive since
the larger the uncertainty the higher the optimal tax rate, while the larger the
determinist part of the return, the smaller the optimal tax rate. Following an
increase in uncertainty, the optimal frontier goes up, and the deviation from the
optimal tax structure will thus be reduced by the …scal harmonization for more
“too high” tax rates and less “too small” tax rates. In the same way, following
an increase in the determinist part of the return, the optimal frontier goes down
and the deviation from it will get smaller thanks to the …scal harmonization for
more “too low” tax rates and less “too high”tax rates.
However this does not tell us much on how uncertainty a¤ects the size of
S(¿ 1;¿2) or, in other words, the likelihood to observe a welfare improving …scal
harmonization. In fact is possible to rank (e S1:::e S5) depending on the values of
12Of course, these three expressions de…ne the same relationship between the model para-
meters.
16the model’s parameters. In particular, e S1 corresponds to small values of ¾ (or
of °), and when uncertainty (or the risk aversion) increases, e S2, e S3, e S4, and
…nally e S5 are reached in this precise order. For ®, the exact opposite ranking is
obtained. Using these properties and the results presented in table 1, we have
the following proposition:
Proposition 6 The probability for harmonization to be welfare improving for
any couple of initial taxes between zero and unity is :
² …rst increasing and then decreasing with uncertainty, risk aversion and
with the deterministic part of the assets return.
² monotonically decreasing with the correlation between the assets returns
shocks.
Finally, this process is independent of the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution.
Turning to welfare, consumption and growth, we should note that since the
relationship between welfare and consumption depends on the value of the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution relative to unity (cf. equation (6)), a wel-
fare improving tax harmonization may not be consumption improving. More-













On the one hand, it may easily be shown that a …scal harmonization always
reduces A. On the other hand, since both welfare and Â¤ reacts in the same
way to tax variations, a welfare improving …scal harmonization may increase or
reduce B depending on the value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
with respect to unity. Thus, if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is less
than unity, a welfare improving …scal harmonization is growth reducing.
5.2 Example based on France and Germany
To obtain results that may be directly interpreted as a way to appraise the
desirability of a …scal harmonization between European countries, one should
extend the model to n countries. This would only be possible at the cost of
giving up analytical resolutions and turning to numerical simulations, which is
out of the scope of the paper since it aims at explaining the e¤ect of taxes:
In this section we only intend to give an illustration of the analytical results
we derived. Let us consider two countries, Germany and France. Data for
17the returns of the risky asset in each country is the annual return index of
Datastream (1973-2001). From these data, we derive an average deterministic
rate of return: ® = 12:35%, an average standard deviation ¾ = 26:185% and a
correlation coe¢cient ½1;2 = 0:685: Moreover, taxes on risky returns in France
and in Germany are respectively (see Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000)): ¿F =
26:8% and ¿G = 25:1%. This allows us to compute the optimal tax rates
combinations as well as the frontiers ¿2l(¿1) and ¿ 2u(¿ 1) de…ning the welfare
improving tax harmonization area and to compare their position with respect
to the observed tax couple.
5.2.1 Optimal taxes
The location of the observed tax couple relative to the optimal tax structure
¿ ¤
2(¿1) (or ¿ ¤
1(¿2)) is highly dependent on the value of °. Using analytical re-
sults above, we have that the smaller (resp. larger) °, the greater the chance
for the observed taxes to be too high (resp. too low) compared to what would
be optimal. The is con…rmed by the analysis of the special case of Germany
and France (see …gure 1). If ° = 2:5 taxes need to be reduced to reach an
optimal couple. The opposite applies for ° = 3:5. It may be computed that in
the particular case of ° = 2:95, the observed tax structure coincides with an
optimal one.
Insert …gure 4
5.2.2 Welfare improving harmonization
It is rather intuitive that as for the optimal tax structure, the location of the
observed tax couple relative to the frontiers ¿2l(¿1) and ¿ 2u(¿1) depends on the
value of °. For given values of the average deterministic return and volatility, we
have seen that the frontiers move up (while the gap between them is decreasing)
with °. This is con…rmed by …gure 2 which represents these frontiers for ° = 2.5
and ° = 3. In fact, for values of ° in the range [2:125;2:925], it may be shown
that a tax harmonization starting from the observed tax couple for France and
Germany would be welfare improving.
Insert …gure 5
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a two-country model in order to analyze how …scal
harmonization impacts on economic growth and welfare through its e¤ects on
agents portfolio decisions. In such a framework, taxes a¤ect growth because,
as underlined by Smith (1996), they change the riskiness of disposable income.
The interest to examine the impact of …scal harmonization using this kind of
18approach is that it eliminates standard …scalcompetition aspects to isolate alter-
native channels through which tax harmonization a¤ects economic performance.
We therefore derived the conditions under which a …scal harmonization between
the two countries considered proved to be growth and/or welfare enhancing.
These conditions are related to the stochastic nature of the environment and in
particular to the relevant characteristics of the assets contained in the agents’
portfolio (after tax risk, after tax correlation between assets return) as well as
the preferences of agents towards risk. The main results of the paper suggest (i)
that an increase in uncertainty or in risk aversion (resp. in the deterministic rate
of return ) leads the set of welfare improving pre-harmonization taxes to contain
higher (resp. lower) tax rates and (ii) that the probability for tax harmonization
to be welfare improving is …rst increasing and then decreasing with uncertainty
while it monotonically decreases with the correlation between the assets returns
shocks. A direct application of these results is to highlight a policy choice such
as the one faced by EU authorities between harmonization and a less demanding
cooperation scheme : a less constraining cooperation scheme such as the one
currently favored by the EU may be a choice with a clear economic justi…cation.
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7.1 Appendix
Appendix 1: Model resolution
The program is:




















subject to the constraint of wealth evolution (5) and where V ((t)) is the value
function.
By analogy with the solution of this program when using a standard utility






" ; A > 0 (14)



























































































The …rst order conditions give equation (7) of the text and C(t)¤:
C(t)¤ = A¡"W (t)
Note that maximizing the expected value of the intertemporal utility with re-
spect to !(t) reduces to the maximization of the certainty equivalent of the
portfolio rate of return which is:
Â(t) = [!(1¡ ¿1) + (1¡ !)(1 ¡ ¿ 2)]® ¡
1
2




(1¡ ¿ 2)2°¾2(1¡ !)2 ¡ ½1;2°¾ 2(1¡ ¿1)(1 ¡ ¿2)!(1 ¡ !)
Then, replacing !(t)¤ and C(t)¤ by their expressions in the Bellman equation
(16) allows to identify A :




¤(t) = ®(1¡ ¿ 1)!(t)






(1¡ ¿ 1)2!(t)¤2 + 2½1;2(1 ¡ ¿ 1)(1¡ ¿2)!(t)¤(1 ¡ !(t)¤) + (1¡ ¿2)2(1 ¡ !(t)¤)2¤
which leads to equation (6) in the text.
Appendix 2 :Relationship between !¤ and ¿ 1.
Let us de…ne f(!;¿1) =
@Â

























































Appendix 3: Proof of proposition 2
It mayeasily be shown that Â(!¤;¿1) has noasymptotes and that lim¿1!¡1 Â(!¤;¿ 1) =









































@¿1 (see appendix 2) always have the same
sign, we deduce that B ¸ 0. We also have A = ¡°¾ 2!¤.














= 0 corresponds to a minimum of Â(!¤;¿ 1) while the
other root corresponds to a maximum.
Since !¤ = 0 has only one root (see section 3.1), we may deduce that we
only keep one side of Â(!¤;¿ 1) with respect to its minimum to eliminate cases
in which !¤ < 0. Thus we obtain that it is not possible to have Â(!¤;¿ 1)
decreasing and then decreasing with ¿ 1 in the relevant range for the tax.
Appendix 4: De…ning S(¿1;¿2)
The objective is to determine whether S(¿ 1;¿2) corresponds to the area
between or outside the two frontiers ¿2l(¿1) and ¿2u(¿ 1). One easily shows that
both ¿¤
2(¿1) and ¿2l(¿1) cross the 45± line at the same point with a (-1) slope.









which imply that at least one point
of ¿¤
2(¿1) is below ¿2l(¿1). Since by de…nition, all couples (¿1;¿2) belonging to
the optimal tax locus ¿¤
2(¿1) are outside S(¿1;¿2); it follows that it is the area
between the two frontiers which is welfare improving.
Appendix 5: Expressions and illustrations for e S1(¿ 1;¿2); e S2(¿1;¿2); e S3(¿1;¿2); e S4(¿1;¿2)
and e S5(¿ 1;¿2)
22Using (11) and (12) we obtain that:
² If e ¿2u(¿1) contains couples of taxes with both elements between 0 and 1/2:





If e ¿2u(¿ 1) contains couples of taxes with both elements between 1/2 and 1:






























² If e ¿2l(¿1) contains couples of taxes with both elements between 0 and 1/2:





If e ¿2l(¿1) does not contains couples of taxes with both elements between





Figures 6 to 12 illustrate these cases.
Appendix 6: Appraising the error due to the approximation
The analytical results obtained in section 5 have been derived using a linear
approximation. In order to appraise whether ignoring the curvature of both
curves a¤ects these results we now turn to numerical simulations.
We consider the evolution of the welfare improving initial taxes area succes-
sively, depending on one of the di¤erent model parameters, the other parameters
being …xed to the values we used in the example based on France and Germany.
The result appearing on …gures 13 to 16 is that both the real area and the
approximated one behave exactly in the same way when the model parameters
vary.








Figure 4: solid line : ° = 2:5 ; big-dashed line : ° = 3 ; small-dashed line
° = 3:5
Appendix 6: Approximations S(¿ 1;¿ 2)










































































































































































Figure 12: ~ S5(¿1;¿2)
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